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In 1981, a new breed of partnership was born - a master limited
partnership.' Although the parameters of this new species are not yet
clearly defined, widespread consensus exists that these large, publicly
traded partnerships do not fit cleanly within the structure of the
partnership rules in subchapter K. 2 The debate over the proper treatment of master limited partnerships resulted in the enactment of a
provision in the Revenue Act of 19873 that will cause certain "publicly
traded partnerships" to be taxed as corporations. 4 This paper explores
the difficulties of treating master limited partnerships under the provisions of subchapter K and examines whether the Revenue Act of
1987 solves the problems presented by these entities.
I.

GROWTH OF MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

The term "master limited partnership" arose as a description of
the method by which these large publicly traded partnerships were
first developed. An independent oil company formed the first master
limited partnership in 1981. The company consolidated thirty pre-existing drilling and exploration limited partnerships into one "master"

limited partnershipA The partners of the drilling and exploration
partnerships contributed their partnership interests to a new limited
partnership in return for limited partnership interests in the new

1. Lyman, An Overview of the Origin and Tax Treatment of Publicly Traded (Master)
Limited Partnerships,13 Tax Mgmt., WASH. TAX REV. 113 (1987).
2. See STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS

(Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter

PRELIMINARY REPORT];

Tax Treatment of Master

Limited Partnerships:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (statement of J. Roger Mentz,
Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter Tax Treatment of
Master Limited Partnerships];A.L.I., FederalIncome Tax Project, SubchapterK 383-85 (1984);
Canellos, CorporateIntegrations:By Design or By Default, TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 999
(June 8, 1986).
3. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203.
4. Id. § 10211(a); I.R.C. § 7704 (1986). Unless otherwise noted, all I.R.C. citations refer
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1988 as amended.
5. Limberg, Master Limited PartnershipsOffer SignificantBenefits, 65 J. TAX'N 84 (1986).
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entity. This method of forming a master limited partnership is called
a "roll up" and is generally used to combine several smaller limited
partnerships into one large partnership. The definition of master limited partnerships has expanded over the past seven years, and 'master limited partnership" now refers more generally to large partnerships that are widely held and whose ownership interests are frequently traded.
Master limited partnerships can also be formed in rollout transactions, acquisition transactions, liquidation transactions, and initial formations.6 A rollout transaction generally involves a corporate sponsor
that contributes assets to a limited partnership in return for partnership interests. 7 The corporate general partner then sells the limited
partnership interests. An acquisition transaction is similar to the rollout master limited partnership except that instead of contributing
assets, the corporate sponsor acts as the general partner in a limited
partnership that sells its interests to the public. The new limited
partnership then purchases assets from either the corporate sponsor
or an unrelated party. Liquidation transactions involve the contribution of all of the corporate sponsor's assets to a limited partnership
in return for partnership interests that are then distributed to the
corporate shareholders in complete liquidation. 9
Between 1981 and 1987, the number of master limited partnerships
grew markedly. 0 The Department of the Treasury found that from
1981 through 1985, forty-eight master limited partnerships had been
formed and were being traded on established exchanges.,, In 1986
alone, thirty-eight additional exchange-traded master limited partnerships were formed, and in the first six months of 1987, another forty
had been marketed.' 2
In addition to burgeoning numbers of master limited partnerships,
these entities were changing qualitatively as well. Prior to 1986, most
master limited partnerships held real estate and oil and gas property.
Since then, the number of non-real estate and non-oil and gas master

6. JOINT CoM. ON TAXATION, TAx TREATMENT OF MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS,
JCS 18-87 23 (1987) [hereinafter JOINT COMMrrrEE ON TAXATION]; Lyman, supra note 1.
7. JOINT COMMrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 21.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id. at 23.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships,supra note 2, at Table 2.
12. Id.
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limited partnerships has increased significantly.13Among the new master limited partnership offerings were such established businesses as
14
Burger King, Mauna Loa Macadamia, and the Boston Celtics.
II.

TREATMENT OF MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1987

BEFORE

A. Formation
The formation of a limited partnership, including a master limited
partnership that qualifies for partnership treatment, is not a taxable
event. The contribution of property to a partnership in return for
partnership interests will not cause either the partner or the partnership to recognize gain. 5 The partner will have a basis in his partnership
interest equal to the adjusted basis of the property contributed, 16 and
the partnership will have a basis in the contributed assets equal to
the adjusted basis of the property to the contributing partner immediately before contribution.1 7 In an acquisition transaction, where
the partnership sells its interests to the public for cash and then
purchases assets, the partners will take a cost basis in their partnership interests, and the partnership will have a cost basis in its assets. 18
In a rollout transaction, where a corporate sponsor contributes appreciated or depreciated assets, the partnership will take a basis in
the property equal to the corporation's basis immediately before the
contribution. 19 The corporate sponsor will have a basis in its partnership interests equal to the bases of the property contributed. 2° When
the corporation sells the limited partnership interests, it will recognize
gain on the sale. The purchaser of the limited partnership interest
will take a cost basis. Generally a sale of a partnership interest will
not affect the partnership's basis in its assets 2' unless the partnership
has made an election under section 754.2

13. Leonard, A PragmaticView of CorporateIntegration, TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS)
889, 896 (June 1, 1987).
14. Id.; see also Lyman, supra note 1, at 116 n.28.
15. I.R.C. § 721.
16. Id. § 722.
17. Id. § 723.
18. Id. §§ 722, 1012.
19. Id. § 732.
20. Id. § 722.
21. Id. § 743(a).
22. Id. §§ 743(b), 754; see infra text accompanying notes 73-80 for discussion of § 754
elections and basis adjustments.
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Benefit of PartnershipStatus

The primary source of tension in the master limited partnership
area is the different tax treatment accorded partnerships and corporations. The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code treat corporations
as separate taxable entities that are distinct from their shareholders
and subject corporations to taxation on their income.2 Shareholders
incur a second level of taxation when they receive corporate dividends
or other corporate distributions that are not treated as a return of
capital.4 Corporate earnings, therefore, are subject to two levels of
taxation. In contrast, partnerships are not taxable entities.5 Rather,
partnerships are generally treated as aggregations of their partners.2
Partnership income is taxed currently to the partners, and items of
partnership loss are passed through for deduction by the partners.2
Partnership earnings, therefore, are taxed only once at the partner
level. This generally provides a tax advantage to businesses that are
able to operate in partnership form because they can generate larger
after-tax yields for their partners than a similarly situated corporation
can pay to its shareholders.2
C.

Additional Benefits of PartnershipTreatment After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986
1. Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided additional incentives for
doing business in partnership rather than corporate form. First, the

23.
24.

I.R.C. § 11.
Id. § 301.

25.

Id. § 701.

26. Partnerships are treated as separate entities for certain reporting and compliance purposes. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6031, 6050K, 6221-6233; see also Taylor, MasterLimited Partnerships,
46 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx 28-1, 28-30 to 28-33 (1988).
27. I.R.C. § 702.
28. For example, if a corporation had $100 of income subject to the top marginal corporate
rate of 34%, the corporation would incur a tax liability of $34. When the corporation distributes
the remaining $66 to its shareholders, assuming they are subject to the top marginal individual
rate of 28%, they will have a tax liability of $18.48. This leaves an after-tax return of $47.52.
Alternatively, if a partnership had earned the same $100 of income, the partnership would not
owe any federal income tax. The partners of the partnership would currently include as income
their distributive share of the partnership income, and they would incur a tax liability of $28.
This leaves an after-tax return of $72, which is $24.48 more than the corporate shareholders'
after-tax return. Only corporations that can qualify and elect to be treated as an S Corporation
can achieve this pass-through treatment. I.R.C. §§ 1362-1363.
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repeal of the General Utilities2 doctrine by the 1986 legislation meant
that corporate liquidations would no longer be tax free at the corporate
level. Corporations that could liquidate before the effective date, therefore, had one last chance to remove appreciated assets from corporate
solution with only one level of tax at the shareholder level. Corporate
liquidations are now taxable events both at the corporate and shareholder levels3 Consequently, the number of master limited partnerships formed in liquidation transactions are expected to be minimal in
future years.3 1
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine also has a continuing
impact on the choice of business entities. Not only did the repeal
encourage disincorporation; it also discourages future incorporation.Y
Because appreciated corporate assets can no longer be removed from
corporate solution without the recognition of gain at the corporate
level,3 businesses will be reluctant to place their assets in corporate
solution in the first place.3 Rather, businesses that can do so will
prefer to operate as partnerships.
2. Inversion of Corporate and Individual Income Tax Rates
The second benefit of partnership status provided by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is that it continued the trend of lowering individual
income tax rates. For tax years beginning after 1986, the top marginal
rate of corporate income taxs' is higher than the top individual rate.m
This inversion of tax rates creates pressure on businesses to select
partnership form because of the proportionately larger tax expense
of corporate status. Although this trend of reducing the spread between corporate and individual rates began in 1982, 37 the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 exacerbated the difference in the incidence of tax on
corporate and partnership earnings.
29.

General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). This decision was

codified at I.R.C. § 336 (1954) and subsequently repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 631(a).
30. I.R.C. §§ 301, 336.
31. Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships,supra note 2, at 24.
32. Freeman, Some Early Strategiesfor the Methodical Disincorporationof America After
the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Grafting PartnershipsOnto C Corporations,Running Amok with
the Master Limited PartnershipConcept, and Generally Endeavoring to Defeat the Intention
of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of General Utilities, 64 TAXES 962 (1986).
33. I.R.C. § 336.
34. Zolt, Corporate TaxationAfter the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Disequilibrium,
66 N.C.L. REv. 839 (1988).
35. I.R.C. § 11.
36. Id. § 1.
37. See Mack, DisincorporatingAmerica, FORBES, Aug. 1, 1983, at 76.
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Prior to 1982, businesses that did not have losses to pass through
to their investors preferred to be taxed as corporations. The large
discrepancy between the top marginal corporate rate of 46 percent
and the top marginal individual rate of 70 percent8 meant that "capital
formation was significantly enhanced by operating and retaining earnings in the corporate form.''39 As personal tax rates were reduced,
however, the benefits of operating as a corporation also declined as
the deferral of the payment of individual income tax liability became
less valuable. When individual rates dropped to 50 percent in 1982,40
the advantage of partnership status - avoiding the double taxation
caused by operating as a corporation - outweighed the benefit of
deferring the payment of the higher level of individual income tax in
certain circumstances. 41 As individual tax rates have continued to decline, interest in using the partnership form of doing business has
increased.
3. Passive Loss Rules
Their status as partnerships after the Tax Reform Act of 1986
gave master limited partnerships an additional advantage. Income
from master limited partnerships could be used to offset section 469
passive losses. Section 469 was enacted as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 and was designed to limit the use of certain losses. Losses
from partnerships in which the taxpayer does not materially participate
will be classified as passive losses. 42 Passive losses cannot be used to
offset salary and portfolio income. 43 Passive losses, however, can be
used to offset income to the extent that the taxpayer has passive
income. 44 Passive income consists of income from the conduct of a
trade or business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate.46 Except as the Secretary provides in regulations, a limited partner cannot materially participate in a limited partnership. 46 Passive

38. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11(b) (1982).
39. Million & Bolding, Metamorphosis: Liquidation of the Corporationinto a Publicly
Traded Limited Partnership,38 Bus. LAw. 1487, 1488 (1983).
40. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101(a); I.R.C. § 1 (1982).
41. Whether the deferral was more valuable than avoiding the second level of tax depends
on the length of the deferral and the rate of the second tax.
42. I.R.C. § 469(d).
43. Id. § 469; see generally Oberst, The Passive Activity Provisions - A Tax Policy
Blooper, 40 U. FLA. L REv. 641 (1988).
44. I.R.C. § 469(d).
45. Id. § 469(c).
46. Id. § 469(h)(2).
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losses, therefore, could be used to offset income from master limited
partnerships even though, from the investor's perspective, that income is economically indistinguishable from dividend income that
could not be netted against passive losses. This benefit of partnership
status, however, was short-lived. The Revenue Act of 1987 amended
section 469 to prevent income from master limited partnerships from
being used to offset passive losses from non-master limited partnership
activities. 47
III.

PROBLEMS CAUSED BY TREATING MASTER LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS AS PARTNERSHIPS

Treating master limited partnerships as partnerships causes problems in three general areas. First, master limited partnerships are
economically very similar to publicly traded corporations, but they
are treated very differently for tax purposes. This raises important
questions about tax equity. Second, treating master limited partnerships as partnerships effectively allows businesses that can operate
as partnerships to elect out of incurring any corporate tax liability potentially causing serious erosion of the corporate tax base. Third,
the complexity of master limited partnerships makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for them to comply with the subchapter K rules.
The questions raised by master limited partnerships about equity
and administrative problems are not new. By 1983, the Staff of the
Senate Finance Committee was already suggesting that master limited
partnerships be treated as corporations.4 In 1984, the American Law
Institute proposed corporate tax treatment for master limited partnerships. 49 The Treasury Department, in 1984, also supported reclassify-

ing master limited partnerships as corporations2 ° The growth of master limited partnerships during the mid-1980s heightened concerns
about the complexity of administering the subchapter K rules in the
master limited partnership area and about the similarities between
master limited partnerships and corporations. Revenue concerns
created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, provided the necessary impetus for the enactment of provisions to reclassify master limited partnerships. The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine raised
fears that many large, publicly-held corporations would engage in liqui-

47. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10212(a).
48. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supz note 2, at 50-51.
49.

A.L.I., supra note 2, at 383-85.

50.

TREAS. DEPT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLIC-

ITy, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (reasury I) (1984).
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dation transactions prior to the effective date of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 and continue business in the form of master limited partnerships.1 This would remove earnings from the corporate tax base and
eliminate a large part of the revenues that the corporate income tax
was expected to raise.
The provisions in the Revenue Act of 1987 that reclassify master
limited partnerships as corporations are based, in large part, on the
assumptions that these entities really function like corporations rather
than partnerships and that the partnership rules cannot be accurately
applied to them. This section first explores the similarities between
master limited partnerships and corporations and then examines the
difficulty of applying the partnership provisions to master limited
partnerships. Parts IV and V address whether the Revenue Act of
1987 solves the tax equity and administrative problems previously
raised.
A.

Classificationof Master Limited Partnerships

Prior to the Revenue Act of 1987, the Kintner regulations set forth
the test of whether a master limited partnership would be treated as
an association taxable as a corporation or as a partnership. 52 These
regulations identify six characteristics that are "found in a pure corporation which, taken together, distinguish it from other organizations."
These characteristics are: "(i) associates, (ii) an objective to carry on
a business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv)
centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited
to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests. '' 4 A
partnership will be treated as an association taxable as a corporation
if it 'more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership. ' ' r- Because both corporations and partnerships have as common characteristics associates and an objective to carry on a business and divide the
gains therefrom, those traits will be disregarded in determining
whether the partnership will be taxed as a corporation. If a partnership lacks two of the four remaining characteristics, its status as a
partnership will be respected for tax purposes.5 7 Most limited partner-

51. Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships, supra note 2; JOINT COmmIrEE ON
TAXATION, supra note 6, at 20.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1983).
Id. § 301.7701-2(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1960).
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ships, including master limited partnerships, do not possess the characteristic of continuity of life because death, insanity, or bankruptcy of
the general partner will cause the termination of the partnership. 8 In
addition, liability for partnership debts is not limited to partnership
property if the general partner is not a "dummy" or has a substantial
amount of assets 9
Master limited partnerships can fulfill the necessary requirements
to avoid being treated as associations taxable as corporations rather
easily. Most states have adopted partnership laws that provide for
the termination of the partnership on the death, insanity, or bankruptcy of the general partner. Case law has held that even if the limited
partners can replace the general partner, the possibility that the
partnership could terminate under state law precludes the partnership
from having the characteristic of continuity of life.6° Furthermore, a
general partner that either has a substantial amount of assets or plays
an active managerial role in the partnership business will be considered
as having unlimited liability. The classification rules consider only the
above-listed characteristics, and the determination does not turn on
whether the partnership interests are publicly traded. Through careful
planning, many businesses could, in effect, choose whether to be
treated as partnerships by forming a master limited partnership that
complied with a state's uniform limited partnership act or as a corporation merely by incorporating under state law.
B. Critique of ClassificationRules
The economic similarities between publicly-traded corporations and
publicly traded limited partnerships, when contrasted with their significantly different tax treatment, raise important questions of tax
equity and neutrality. Although master limited partnerships do not
have sufficient "corporate characteristics" to be classified as corporations under the Kintner regulations, a more economically realistic resemblance test suggests that master limited partnerships are very
much like corporations. The two noncorporate characteristics that enable master limited partnerships to retain their partnership status are
lack of continuity of life and unlimited liability. A partnership agreement can easily comply with the letter of the regulations, while in
spirit, and actuality, the partnership has the ability to prolong its life

58.
59.
60.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1960).
Id. § 301.7701-2.
Larson, 66 T.C. at 159.
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indefinitely through the replacement of its general partner by vote of
the limited partners. Furthermore, it can limit its liability by adequate
insurance coverage or by utilizing a corporate general partner. The
continuation of this scheme of classifying entities means that certain
businesses capable of operating as partnerships can effectively elect
61
out of the corporate income tax.
Large partnerships that are listed and publicly traded on established securities markets are, in many respects, indistinguishable from
publicly traded corporations. The partners of a master limited partnership are generally investors that are not concerned with the identity
of the other partners; rather, they view investment in these partnerships much the same way they view corporate stock. Commentators
and planners have noted that "[t]here is ... another type of business
entity, the [publicly traded] limited partnership, which can be structured essentially to embody the salient features of a corporation from
the investor's point of view."6' Master limited partnerships, therefore,
are competing for the same capital investment as corporations but can
promise higher yields because of the competitive edge created by the
tax advantages of operating in partnership form. 63 This different treatment of economically similar taxpayers undercuts tax equity.
Tax neutrality also suffers when tax considerations determine the
selection of business form. This raises questions of whether there are
business reasons for organizing and doing business as a master limited
partnership or whether this decision is driven primarily by tax considerations. Opponents of taxing master limited partnerships as corporations assert various business reasons for forming master limited
partnerships - from a master limited partnership serving as a useful
financing alternative to a master limited partnership acting as a defense in takeover battles by addressing the market undervaluation of
certain assets.6 4 Proponents of taxing master limited partnerships as
corporations, however, point out that many of these same ends can
be accomplished through corporate means. For example, if the marketplace has really undervalued certain assets, the corporation could
draw attention to those assets by contributing them to a corporate
subsidiary as easily as transferring them to a master limited partnership. Alternatively, if the "undervaluation" of the assets in corporate
solution is due to the imposition of the corporate level tax, the lower

61.
62.
63.
64.

Canellos, supra note 2, at 999.
Million & Bolding, supra note 39, at 1487.
Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships,supra note 2, at Table 1.
Lyman, upra note 1, at 117.
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value does not reflect a market dysfunction. Rather, the increased
value of assets held in partnership form is merely a manifestation of
the lack of tax neutrality. Given the additional expense caused by
accounting, record keeping, and legal complexities of doing business
as a partnership,6 "the primary reason [for] talking about publicly
traded partnerships is that they are superior to corporations for tax
purposes." The primary importance of the tax benefits of partnership
characterization of master limited partnerships was highlighted in a
report on the decline of master limited partnership prices. The Wall
Street Journal noted that, "[s]everal factors conspired to drive prices
down in 1987. Most notable were congressional threats to tax MLPs
as corporations - which effectively would have reduced annual payouts by about a third and eliminated MLPs' main advantage over
regular stocks. '"

It is clear that the classification scheme in place prior to the Revenue Act of 1987 did not operate in a way that promoted tax equity.
The flaw, however, lies not in the theory of the test but in its application. The underlying rationale of the test in the regulations is that
the substance of an entity should prevail over the label given to it by
its investors, and the substance of an entity should be determined by
exploring whether it functions more like a corporation or more like
another business entity. A well-formulated test that carried out this
comparison in a realistic way would subject economically similar entities to the same tax burden.
The test articulated by the regulations fails to perform adequately
a realistic comparison of economic similarity. The range of attributes
explored is too narrow and the weighing of those attributes is too
mechanical. For example, rather than relying on state law to determine
that continuity of life does not exist because there is a possibility that
the partnership will terminate if the corporate general partner becomes
bankrupt, the test should require a determination of the probability
that the bankruptcy of the general partner will cause a termination
of the partnership. If a partnership agreement allows the limited
partners to replace the general partner by a vote, the probability that

65. MYillion & Bolding, supra note 39, at 1499.
66. Publicly TradedLimited Partnership:An EmergingFinancialAlternative to the Public
Corporation, 39 Bus. LAw. 709, 721 (J. Slater ed. 1984) (transcript of presentation by the

committee on partnerships and unincorporated business organizations at the ABA annual meeting
in Atlanta on Aug. 2, 1983).
67.

Donnelly, MLP Price Fall Seen CreatingSome Bargains, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1988, §

2, at 39, col. 3.
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the general partner's bankruptcy will force a termination of the
partnership is very low. Furthermore, in that situation, the limited
partners control whether the partnership will be terminated. This
control is very similar to corporate shareholders' rights to continue
or liquidate a corporation. The equity and neutrality questions that
existed prior to the Revenue Act of 1987 could have been addressed
by designing a more realistic test of corporate similarity.
C.

Applying PartnershipRules to Master Limited Partnerships

A major area of difficulty with treating master limited partnerships
as partnerships is that the transactions engaged in by a large publicly
held partnership do not mesh with the technical partnership rules and
exacerbate the ever-present tension between treatment of a partnership as a separate entity for some purposes but as an aggregate of
its partners for other purposes.r The implicit underpinnings of the
subchapter K rules that treat the partnership as an aggregate of its
partners is that the partnership will know who its partners are and
when they became partners. When anonymous exchange trading takes
place, however, the partnership cannot fulfill many of the subchapter
K rules.
1. Section 706(d)
Section 706(d) requires that if there is a change in a partner's
interest during the taxable year, then each partner's share of any
item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit for that taxable year
must take into account the varying interests of the partners in the
partnership during such taxable year9 Furthermore, a cash basis
partnership must prorate interest, taxes, and payments for services
or for the use of property on a daily basis. 70 These rules prevent
taxpayers from shifting income and deductions. For example, section
706(d) precludes a partner who purchased a partnership interest on
the last day of the partnership's taxable year from benefiting from
interest expense deductions attributable to his interest for the entire
year that were fortuitously paid on the last day of the year by a cash
basis partnership. The partnership could only allocate 1/365 of the
interest deduction to the late-acquiring partner.

68. See McKee, PartnershipAllocations: The Need for an Entity Approach, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1039 (1980).
69. I.R.C. § 706(d)(1).
70. Id. § 706(d)(2).
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Unless the partnership knows the date of the transfer of the
partnership interest, it will not be able to fulfill its statutory obligations
under section 706. Partnership interests that are frequently traded
on a stock exchange will be difficult to account for and adequate record
keeping will be almost impossible. Master limited partnerships, therefore, have adopted various "conventions" in an attempt to comply with
the partnership rules. In the section 706 area, it has been suggested
that:
The partnership attempts during the trading process and by
mailings to transferees to obtain the trade date of a partnership interest. If information as to the trade date of a particular partnership interest is not available, the trade date will
be deemed to have occurred ten days... before the partnership's transfer agent is notified of the trade. The partnership's income and losses are determined on a monthly basis
.... The income and losses are allocated among the interest
holders as of the end of the month - transferors during the
71
month are not allocated any income or losses for the month.
This solution, however, is not ideal, "[b]ecause of possible long
delays between the trade date and the notification date, this procedure
may have distortive results in certain instances, risking challenge by
the Internal Revenue Service."72 The lapse of time between the actual
transfer and the notification of the partnership will prevent an accurate
section 706(d) allocation because the section requires an allocation
based on the period of time the partner actually holds the partnership
interest during the taxable year.
2.

Section 754

Difficulties encountered in keeping adequate records and making
accurate adjustments are more extreme in the section 754 context.7
The general rule for adjustments to the basis of partnership assets is
based on an entity approach. The partnership maintains its bases in
its assets independently of transactions engaged in by the partners.74
The section 754 election and section 743(b) basis adjustment, however,
allow a partnership to choose an aggregate approach whereby the sale
of partnership interests affects the basis of partnership assets. If a

71.

Million & Bolding, supra note 39, at 1495.

72. Id.
73.

I.R.C. § 754.

74. Id. § 743(a).
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partnership makes the section 754 election and an interest is transferred, then a transferee partner's proportionate share of the partnership's basis in partnership property is adjusted to reflect the difference
between the transferee's basis in the partnership interest and the
proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property. 75
An incoming partner would prefer that the partnership make the section 754 election any time the purchase price of the partnership interest
exceeds the partner's proportionate share of the adjusted basis in the
partnership property. A section 754 election, however, can also result
in a downward adjustment under section 743(b) whenever the transferee's purchase price is less than the transferee's proportionate share
of the adjusted basis of the partnership property.
In order to make an accurate section 743 adjustment, the partnership must know the purchase price of the transferee's partnership
interest and the transferor's share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property. The increase in basis then must be allocated among
the partnership assets in accordance with section 755,76 which requires
that the partnership allocate the increase in the adjusted basis of
partnership property in a way that reduces the difference between
the fair market value and the adjusted basis of the partnership property. 77 Thus, the partnership also needs to know the fair market values
of its assets at the time of the basis adjustment. The administrative
burden of collecting this information for publicly traded partnerships
is enormous and "[i]n the past, the election was eschewed on the
ground of hopeless administrative and accounting complexity." 78 Publicly traded partnerships, however, argue that new developments in
sophisticated computer programs enable them to overcome the accounting difficulties. 79 These programs address only the record keeping
problems and not the basic collection of information needed to allow
the computation of the basis adjustments. Publicly traded partnerships
still must rely on certain conventions to make the necessary basis
changes. For example, when the purchase price is not available, "[t]he
lowest quoted trading price during the month the transfer takes place,
or is considered to have taken place, might be selected as the deemed
purchase price for the transferee's interests." 8 Furthermore, an ap-

75. Id. § 743.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 743(c).
Id. § 755(a).
Million & Bolding, supra note 39, at 1496.
Lyman, supra note 1, at 123.
Million & Bolding, supra note 39, at 1496.
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praisal of all the partnership's assets each time a publicly traded interest changes hands is not feasible. The master limited partnership
must rely on periodic appraisals at "appropriate intervals" instead of
valuations at the time the interest was purchased.8 ' Although these
assumptions might be within the general policy of sections 754, 743,
and 755, they do not meet the specificity required by the statutory
language.
3.

Fungibility

Most master limited partnerships cannot avoid the complexity of
section 754. If the partnership does not make the election, the absence
of the adjustments provided by sections 754 and 743 prevent the
partnership interests from being fungible. One requirement of public
trading is that all partnership interests being traded must be identical.
If the partnership interests were not alike, purchasers would have to
investigate the tax attributes of the particular interests they were
interested in buying in order to determine the appropriate purchase
price. This is not possible in the anonymous trades that take place on
established securities exchanges. Nonidentical partnership interests
would destroy the partnership's ability to have its interests publicly
traded.
Even with all of its complexities, a section 754 election does not
insure fungibility of partnership interests. Section 704(c) requires that
'income, gain, loss, and deductions with respect to property contributed to the partnership by a partner shall be shared among the
partners so as to take account of the variation between the basis of
the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time
of contribution." This provision is designed to prevent the shifting
of income and loss between partners through the contribution of appreciated or depreciated assets. To a large extent, section 704(c) assists
in the preservation of fungibility by protecting transferees of noncontributing partners from incurring tax liability on precontribution gain.
The regulations under section 704(c),8 however, impose a "ceiling rule"
that limits the total amount of the allocation under section 704(c).

81. Id. The authors suggest that an annual appraisal is 'the most sensible." Id.
82. I.R.C. § 704(c).
83. Old I.R.C. 704(c)(2) regulations can be relied on until the new regulations are issued.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984,213 (1984).
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When the ceiling rule applies and the contributed property is a depreciable asset, the fungibility of partnership interests can be destroyed'4
In rollout transactions, sections 754, 743, and 704(c) can interact
in a manner such that partnership interests are not identical. Section
754 allows an adjustment of basis under section 743. Section 743 measures the amount of that adjustment by comparing the transferee partner's basis in the partnership interest with the partner's corresponding
share of the adjusted basis in the partnership property. The transferee
partner's share of the adjusted basis in the partnership property is
determined by reference to the transferor partner's share of the adjusted basis in the partnership property. The transferor partner's
share is determined under section 704(c) if the partnership holds any
assets that contained built-in gain or loss at the time of their contribution. Therefore, if section 704(c) creates dissimilarities between
partnership interests received in return for contributions of property
and partnership interests purchased for cash, interests sold by
partners who contributed property will not be fungible with interests
sold by partners who purchased their interests. In situations where
the ceiling rule applies to depreciable assets that are either held until
fully depreciated or sold at a loss, the partnership interests of contributing partners will have different tax attributes than those of
noncontributing partners, and taxable income, in effect, will be shifted
to noncontributing partners.
For example, assume A and B form the AB partnership. A contributes depreciable property with a fair market value of $100 and an
adjusted basis to A of $40. B contributes $100 of cash. Section 704(c)
allocates the built-in gain of $60 to A on the sale of the property. If
the property were sold immediately after its contribution, the partnership would have $60 of gain, which would all be allocated to A, and
no income shifting would occur. If the partnership holds and depreciates the property, the result is quite different. Theoretically, B
should be allocated a basis for depreciation of $50 if the difference
between the fair market value and the adjusted basis of the property
were to be fully taken into account. The ceiling rule, however, applies
and limits the amount of depreciation that can be allocated to B to
the amount of depreciation allowable to the partnership.s Therefore,

84. For a more extensive discussion of the interaction between §§ 704 and 754, and suggested
solutions through the use of curative § 704(c) allocations, see Marich & McKee, Sections 704(c)
and 743(b): The Shortcomings of Existing Regulations and the Problems of Publicly Traded
Partnerships,41 TAx L. REv. 627 (1986).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1986).
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over the life of the depreciable asset, B will be limited to $40 of
depreciation deductions. Over the depreciable life of the asset, A will
have effectively either deferred his tax liability or even shifted $10
of taxable income to B. If the property is sold for a gain of at least
$10, then $10 will be allocated to A. A, however, will have had the
benefit of deferring the tax on this $10 of gain until the partnership
disposes of the property, and B's gain recognition will have been
accelerated over the depreciable life of the property because B's depreciation deductions were reduced due to the ceiling rule. If the property
is sold for either no gain or for a loss, there is no mechanism to correct
for the under-allocation of depreciation to B, and B will bear the $10
of gain that was built in when A contributed the property.
The regulations for the basis adjustment under section 743 illustrate
that this shift of income, and the dissimilar tax attributes as between
A and B, will be preserved in their transferees7 If AB partnership
has made an effective section 754 election and A sells his interest to
C for $100 immediately after the partnership is formed, C's basis
adjustment will be $60 (the $100 purchase price, which is C's basis in
the partnership interest, less the $40 that was C's share of the basis
of partnership assets). Because there is only one asset, the entire $60
adjustment will be allocated to the contributed property. Therefore,
C's inside basis for depreciation purposes is $60. This is $10 higher
than C's cost basis would have been had C purchased a one-half interest
in the property at its fair market value. C, as A's transferee, can still
shift $10 of taxable income to B. Conversely, if C had purchased B's
interest, C would still bear the tax liability for the extra $10 of income
that A shifted to B. When B sells B's interest to C for $100, the
amount of the section 743 adjustment is $0 because C's $100 basis in
the partnership interest does not exceed the $100 share in the basis
of the partnership assets that C received from B. C cannot increase
the basis of the property for depreciation purposes. C continues to
use B's $40 basis for depreciation, which is less than the cost basis
would have been had C purchased a one-half interest in the property.
C, therefore, would prefer to purchase A's partnership interest, and
C would only buy B's partnership interest for a lower purchase price
because of the negative tax attributes that B's interest carried.

86. The liquidation of the partnership could correct for this shifting, but in a publicly traded
partnership, liquidation is unlikely, and when it does occur, the identity of the partners will
have changed significantly.
87. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.743-1(b)(2)(i), 1.743-1(b)(2)(iv) (1956).
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The distortions caused by the section 704(c) ceiling rule are not
unique to master limited partnerships. Rather, differences of tax attributes in partnership interests are a larger concern for these partnerships than for partnerships that are not frequently traded because
master limited partnerships need to maintain complete uniformity in
order to have their interests publicly traded. The income shifting
caused by the ceiling rule could be corrected in several ways. The
most direct way would be through curative allocations of income to
the contributing partner to redress the shifting of income.8 In the
example above, a curative allocation of $10 over the depreciable life
of the asset to A and his transferees would restore fungibility to the
partnership interests. The regulations under section 704(c), however,
do not presently authorize curative allocations. 89
4. Depreciation
Section 754 could destroy fungibility even if the ceiling rule is not
applicable. If a section 754 election results in an upward adjustment
of the transferee's inside basis pursuant to section 743, depreciation
must be computed based on the higher basis to the transferee partner.
The regulations under section 168 take the position that "[t]he increased portion of the basis shall be taken into account under this
section as if it were newly-purchased recovery property placed in
service when the . . . transfer occurs." 90 The example given in the

proposed regulation allows a change in the depreciation method only
to the extent of the section 743 adjustment, and "[n]o change shall be
made ...

for the portion of the basis for which there is no increase."91

Each asset affected by the section 743 adjustment could have two
different recovery periods and methods. Presumably, if this interest
were transferred again, the two periods and methods would be continued by the new transferee. Each interest that carries with it a
section 743 adjustment would be identical neither to interests that
had never been traded nor to interests that had been transferred
subject to a section 754 election at a different time.

88. Marich & McKee, supra note 84, at 690-92.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2) only authorizes the allocation of depreciation, depletion, gain,
or loss. It is not clear under current regulations if a curative allocation would have a substantial
economic effect under I.R.C. § 704(b). See Close & Kusnetz, The Final 704(b) Regs: Special
Allocations Reach New Heights of Complexiy, 40 TAX LAw. 307 (1987).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-2(n) (1988).
91. Id.
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REVENUE ACT OF 1987- RECHARACTERIZATION OF MASTER
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

Congress responded to the concerns and complexities raised by
master limited partnerships in the Revenue Act of 1987.9 The major
thrust of the changes in the Revenue Act is to treat certain "publicly
traded partnerships" as corporations.9 3 Generally, publicly traded
partnerships are defined as any partnership with interests that are
"traded on an established securities market," or has interests that
"are readily tradeable on a secondary market (or the substantial equivalent thereof). "9
A.

Identifying PartnershipsThat Are Publicly Traded

The Conference Committee Report definition of an established securities market includes "any national securities exchange registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or exempted from registration because of the limited volume of transactions, and any local exchange.''95 Established securities markets also include any over the
counter market that "is characterized by an interdealer quotation system which regularly disseminates quotations of obligations by identiffied brokers or dealers, by electronic means or otherwise." Thus,
master limited partnerships that are traded on an established securities
market are easily identified.
The Revenue Act of 1987, however, also includes in its definition
of publicly traded partnerships those partnerships that are readily
tradeable on a secondary market or the substantial equivalent thereof.9
The Conference Committee Report describes interests as being readily
tradeable on a secondary market if the "partners are... readily able
to buy, sell or exchange their partnership interests in a manner that
is comparable, economically, to trading on established securities markets." 98 A secondary market is defined by reference to Treasury Regulation 15A.453-1(e)(4)(iii) and "is generally indicated by the existence
of a person standing ready to make a market in the interest." Again,
master limited partnerships that are tradeable in a secondary market
should be easily identified because an identifiable market maker must
exist.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203.
I.R.C. § 7704(a).
Id. § 7704(b).
H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 947, reprintedin 1987 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1245, 1693 [hereinafter Conference Committee Report].
96. Id.
97. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(a); I.R.C. § 7704(b)(2).
98. Conference Committee Report, supra note 95, at 948.
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The more difficult question arises in identifying the "substantial
equivalent" of a secondary market. The Conference Committee Report
states that:
The substantial equivalent of a secondary market exists
where there is not an identifiable market maker but the
holder of an interest has a readily available, regular and
ongoing opportunity to sell or exchange his interest through
a public means of obtaining or providing information of offers
to buy, sell, or exchange interests. Similarly, the substantial
equivalent of a secondary market exists where prospective
buyers and sellers have the opportunity to buy, sell or exchange interests in a time frame and with the regularity and
continuity that the existence of a market maker would provide.9
The Report attempts to provide some safe harbors for interests
that are tradeable on a public market but are not actually being actively
traded. For example, the Report states that "if offers to buy or sell
interests are normally not accepted in a time frame comparable to
that which would be available on a secondary market, then the interests are not treated as readily tradeable on the substantial equivalent
of a secondary market." 1°° In addition, occasional accommodation
trades, provision of information by a general partner to its partners
about intrapartner interest in sales, or the existence of a buy-sell
arrangement between partners will not be enough to establish the
substantial equivalent of a secondary market. 10
Neither the language of the statute nor the Conference Report
gave any bright-line tests of what would, or would not, constitute
public trading on a substantial equivalent of a secondary market. The
Internal Revenue Service, however, in Notice 88-75,102 has provided
some clearly delineated safe harbors.
1. Private Placements
The first safe harbor provided by the Service in Notice 88-75 is
for private placements. Interests in a partnership will not be consid-

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-27 I.R.B. 29. For further discussion of Notice 88-75, see
Loffman, Presant & Lipton, The Impact of Notice 88-75 ConcerningPublicly Traded Partnerships, 40 TAx NoTEs (TAx ANALYSTS) 747 (Aug. 15, 1988); Wertlieb & Hannan, IRS Safe
Harbors Ease Burdensfor Some Publicly Traded Partnerships,69 J. TAx'N 140 (1988).
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ered readily tradeable on the substantial equivalent of a secondary
market if: 1) all the interests in the partnership are issued in a transaction that was not registered under the Securities Act of 1933; and
2) either the partnership does not have more than five hundred
partners or the initial offering price of each unit of partnership interest
is at least $20,000 and the partnership agreement prohibits resale in
smaller units. 103

2. Lack of Actual Trading
The Notice also provides two de minimus safe harbors. Interest
in a partnership are not considered readily tradeable on a secondary
market or the substantial equivalent thereof if the "sum of the percentage interests in partnership capital or profits represented by partnership interests that are sold or otherwise disposed of (including purchases by a partnership of its own interests . .. ) during the taxable
year does not exceed 5 percent of the total interest in partnership
capital or profits."'1 When applying this 5 percent safe harbor, certain
transfers are disregarded. Generally, the excluded transactions are
transfers that are not arm's-length sales between unrelated buyers
and sellers. For example, transfers of partnership interests that are
gifts, transfers at death, intrafamily sales, or distributions from pension plans are disregarded when applying the 5 percent test.105 A 2
percent safe harbor exists in addition to the 5 percent safe harbor.

103.

I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-27 I.R.B. 29, at 30. For purposes of determining the number

of partners, there is a look through to each person who indirectly owns an interest through a
partnership, a grantor trust, or an S Corporation.
104. Id.
105. The following transfers are disregarded when applying the 5% safe harbor:
(i) transfers in which the basis of the partnership interest in the hands of the
transferee is determined, in whole or in part, by reference to its basis in the hands
of the transferor or is determined under section 732; (ii) transfers at death; (iii)
transfers between members of a family (as defined in section 267(c)(4)); (iv) the
issuance of interests... in exchange for cash, property, or services; (v) distributions
from a [qualified] retirement plan... ; (vi) block transfers; (vii) transfers pursuant
to a right under a redemption or repurchase agreement . . . that is exercisable
only (A) upon the death, complete disability, or mental incompetence of the partner,
or (B) upon the retirement or complete termination of the performance of services
of an individual who actively participates in the management of or performs services
on a full time basis for the partnership; and (viii) transfers that are disregarded
[pursuant to redemption agreements in closed end partnerships].... [A] "block
transfer" means the transfer[s] by a partner in one or more transactions during
any thirty calendar day period of partnership interests representing in the aggregate more than 5% of the total interest in partnership capital or profits.
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The 2 percent test does not include transfers disregarded when applying the 5 percent safe harbor. It also disregards certain other transfers,
such as transfers made through matching services °6 and certain redemption and repurchase agreements.' °7
B.

Treatment of Publicly Traded Partnerships

If a partnership is a publicly traded partnership, then the partnership will be treated as a corporation.108 On the first day a partnership
is treated as a corporation, the partnership will be considered to have
transferred all its assets to a newly formed corporation in exchange
for its stock and distributed the stock to the partners in liquidation
of their partnership interests.'09 When the partnership takes steps to
have its interests listed on an exchange, or traded in an over the
counter market, or arranges to have an identifiable market maker, it
is easy to determine the date on which corporate status begins. Conversely, if the partnership interests are considered as traded on the
substantial equivalent of a secondary market where there is no market
maker, fixing the date when trading became sufficiently active to
qualify as '"publicly traded" will be extremely difficult. The partnership
interests can be publicly traded even though the partnership has not
taken explicit action to permit trading. Rather, "[a] partnership is
considered as participating in public trading of its interests where
trading is in fact taking place, . . . and the partnership agreement

imposes no meaningful limitation on the partner's ability to readily
transfer their interests."' o

106. A matching service is a
[listing system that lists customers' bid and/or asks prices in order to match
partners who want to dispose of their interests in a partnership with persons who
want to buy such interests .... In the course of performing these services, the
operator does not regularly quote prices at which the operator stands ready to
buy or sell such interests, make such quotes available to the public, or buy or sell
interests for its own account.
Id. at 31. The transfer of partnership interests through this kind of matching service will be
disregarded for purposes of determining public trading if the timing and volume requirements
are met. Id.
107. The redemption or repurchase of limited partnership interests by a general partner
or person related to the general partner will be disregarded for purposes of determining public
trading if either 1) certain timing and volume requirements are met, or 2) if after the initial
offering, the general partner or a person related to the general partner does not "provide
contemporaneous opportunities to acquire interests in similar or related partnerships which
represent substantially identical investments." Id. at 32.
108. I.R.C. § 7704(a).
109. Id. § 7704(f).
110. Conference Committee Report, supra note 95, at 949.
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Exceptions to Treatment as Corporations
1. Passive Income

Although the definition of a publicly traded partnership seems quite
broad, several exceptions undercut the impact of the statutory recharacterization. Partnerships that have "passive-type income"' will
not be treated as corporations. If 90 percent of a partnership's income
is "qualifying income,"1. it will be considered as having "passive-type"
income. The partnership must meet the 90 percent test in the current
taxable year and in every preceding taxable year beginning after December 31, 1987.113 Qualifying income generally includes interest, dividends, real property rents, gain from the sale of real property, gain
on the sale of capital or section 1231 assets, and gain on commodities
(that are not held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business), futures, options, and forward contracts.114 The Code also
includes in the definition of qualified income 'income and gains derived
from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing,
refining, transportation . . . , or the marketing of any mineral or
natural resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and
timber)."1' 5 The statute also provides a safety net for partnerships
that fail to meet the 90 percent qualifying income test. If the failure
to meet the 90 percent test was inadvertent, the partnership, within
a reasonable time, takes steps to meet the 90 percent test, and the
partnership agrees to make adjustments required by the Secretary,116
then the partnership will be treated as if it had met the 90 percent
qualified income test for the entire period."17 Because master limited
partnerships have most often been used in the oil and gas and real
estate industries, these exceptions substantially limit the effect of the
recharacterization of publicly traded partnerships. For example, of
the existing exchange-traded partnerships listed in the statement of

111.

I.R.C. § 7704(c).

112. Id. § 7704(c)(2).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 7704(d)(1).
115. Id. § 7704(d)(1)(E).
116. Id. § 7704(e). The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, which was passed
by Congress on Oct. 22, 1988, adds language that requires publicly traded partnerships to 'make
adjustments or to pay such amounts as may be required." Pub L. No. 100-647, § 2004(f)(1)
(1988). The amounts required are 'intended to represent an appropriate portion of tax liability
that would be imposed on the partnership if it were treated as a corporation during the period
of failure to meet the 90% requirement." H.R. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 (1988).
117. I.R.C. § 7704(e).
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the Treasury, 66 percent of the master limited partnerships are either
involved in the natural resource or real estate industry and would
likely fit within the passive-type income exception. 118
2. Grandfather Provisions
The Revenue Act of 1987 granted certain master limited partnerships a ten year reprieve from the recharacterization as corporations.119
In order to qualify, master limited partnerships must have been publicly traded on December 17, 1987, have filed a registration statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or before December
17, 1987 indicating that the partnership was to be publicly traded, or
have filed an application to restructure a portion of a corporation as
a publicly traded partnership with a state regulatory agency on or
before December 17, 1987. The Code continues to treat these "existing
partnerships" as partnerships until December 31, 1997.1 0 All other
publicly traded partnerships will be taxed as corporations for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1987. To prevent "existing
partnerships" from manipulating their status, an existing partnership
that adds a substantial new line of business will no longer be treated
as an existing partnership and will be taxed as a corporation.Y' A
substantial new line of business, however, "does not include a line of
business that was specifically described as a proposed business activity
of the partnership ... in a registration statement ... filed ... with
the SEC on or before December 17, 1987."' The Service has provided
some guidance on what the regulations will treat as not being a substantial new line of business. If the partnership "derives no more than
15 percent of its gross income from such line of business and no more
than 15 percent of the value of its total assets are directly used in
such business,"
then the new line of business will not be treated as
,,substantial. '' L
D.

Changes to the Passive Loss Rules

The Revenue Act of 1987 also changed the treatment of publicly
traded partnerships under the passive loss rules of section 469.'2 New
118. Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships,supra note 2, at Table 2.
119. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(c).
120. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 makes explicit what is implicit
in the Revenue Act of 1987. An "existing' publicly traded partnership need not meet the 90%
test until its 10-year grace period expires. Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2004(f)(2) (1988).
121. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(c)(2)(B).
122. Conference Committee Report, supra note 95, at 950.
123. I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-27 I.R.B. 29, at 34.
124. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10212(a) (adding I.R.C. § 469(k)).
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section 469(k) provides that "[t]his section shall be applied separately
with respect to items attributable to each publicly traded partnership."2 The definition of publicly traded partnerships in this section,
like section 7704, includes those that are traded on an established
securities market, or are readily tradeable on a secondary market or
the substantial equivalent thereof.' This language seems to apply the
new section 469(k) limitations to all publicly traded partnerships. The
provisions in section 7704, however, recharacterize all publicly traded
partnerships that do not fit within the listed exceptions as corporations. Therefore, the reference to "partnerships" that are readily tradable in new subsection 469(k) includes only publicly traded partnerships
that are excepted from section 7704 because they have passive-type
income or are existing partnerships.
An apparent contradiction exists between the language of the Conference Committee Report, which generally follows the Senate amendment, and the statutory language that appears in new section 469(k).
The Senate Committee Report begins by stating that "[u]nder the
amendment, net income from publicly traded partnerships is not
treated as passive income" and that "[n]et income from publicly traded
partnerships is treated as portfolio income under the passive loss
rule."' However, the language of the provision enacted does not
recharacterize the income from publicly traded partnerships; rather,
it merely directs that the passive loss rule should apply to each publicly
traded partnership separately. This dichotomy is further highlighted
by a statement later in the Senate Report that refers to "publicly
traded partnerships with income that is treated as portfolio income
(under the passive loss rule as generally applicable)."
If the statute is applied in two separate steps, however, the language of the statute and the Senate Report can be reconciled. Step
one treats the income from publicly traded partnerships as "portfolio
income" as directed in the Senate Report only for the purpose of
segregating that income from other income and losses that receive
the usual treatment as passive income under section 469. This removes
the income from publicly traded partnerships from the netting of passive income and passive losses mechanism of section 469(d). In step
two, the statutory language directs a piercing of the entity to determine whether portfolio, active, or passive income exists by applying
the general passive loss rules of section 469.

125. Id.
126.

Id.

127. S. Doc. No. 63, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Finance Report].
128. Id.
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The first portion of this bipartite application of the statute separates the taxpayer's passive activities into two different baskets one for generic passive activities and one for publicly traded partnerships. For purposes of this test, any net income from the taxpayer's
publicly traded partnerships will be treated as portfolio income, and
any losses from the publicly traded partnership will be separate from
any passive activities.2 9 Income and loss from publicly traded partnerships are thus treated as "nonpassive" activity. When the section
469(d) computation is made, the taxpayer's "passive activity loss" will
be the difference between the aggregate losses and the aggregate
income of all passive activities for the year exclusive of publicly traded
partnership income or loss. These passive activity losses, if any, will
be suspended and carried forward under the general rule of 469(b) to
be used in a later year against any passive income that is not generated
by a publicly traded partnership.
The second portion of the test then applies the passive activity
loss rules in section 469 separately to each publicly traded partnership;
thus the loss from each publicly traded partnership is treated "as
separate from income and loss from any other publicly traded partnership.' 130 Not only is each publicly traded partnership tested individually, but also 'this section shall be applied separately with respect to
items attributable to each publicly traded partnership."''11 Unlike the
general rule of section 469 that looks at a limited partnership interest
as a whole, new section 469(k) looks through the partnership and
decides whether each item of income or loss is a passive activity with
respect to the partner, or whether the item is portfolio income. The
netting of income and loss in section 469(d) only applies to those items
within the publicly traded partnership that are passive activities. This
is where the test of whether income "is treated as portfolio income
(under the passive loss rule as generally applicable)"' is conducted.
Income that is described in section 469(e), such as interest, dividends,
annuities, or royalties, will be treated as portfolio income and will not
be available to offset the operating business losses of the publicly
traded partnership. Any passive activity loss from the publicly traded
partnership will be suspended and carried forward under section
469(b), but these losses can only be used in future years to offset

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203; § 10212(a); I.R.C. § 469(k).
Senate Finance Report, supra note 127, at 161.
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passive activity income from the same publicly traded partnership
until the taxpayer disposes of the entire interest in that publicly traded
partnership. 13
For example, assume P is a limited partner in four different
partnerships, A, B, C, and D. A and B are not publicly traded partnerships; C and D are publicly traded partnerships that are not treated
as corporations because they are existing partnerships. In 1991, A
has net income of $40; B has a net loss of $60; C has a net loss from
its trade or business of $50 and has $75 of dividend income; D has
net income from its trade or business of $80. For 1991, P can net the
income and loss from partnerships A and B under the general rules
of section 469 because they are not publicly traded partnerships. P
cannot net the remaining $20 of loss with either the net operating
income from D or the dividend income of C. Instead, the $20 of loss
is suspended and carried over to a later year when C can use it to
offset income from A or B. C has a net loss from operations of $50
that C cannot offset against C's dividend income of $75 because the
section 469 limitations will be applied to each item of income or loss,
and the dividend income is an item that will be treated as portfolio
income when section 469(e) is applied to it separately. Nor can P offset
his $50 of loss from partnership C against the operating gain from
partnership D as section 469 applies separately to each publicly traded
partnership as well as to each item within a publicly traded partnership. This individualized scrutiny of each publicly traded partnership
and each partnership item prevents the avoidance of the passive activity loss rules by preventing taxpayers from converting what would
be portfolio income into passive income through the use of a limited
partnership.
A publicly traded partnership can have several combinations of
income and losses. If a partnership has portfolio income and, after
netting passive activity gains and losses, has a passive loss, then the
loss will not offset the portfolio gain and will be carried forward. A
partnership, instead, could have portfolio income and net passive gain
from that publicly traded partnership. The segregation of publicly
traded partnerships from all other passive activities effectively treats
the net passive gain like portfolio income by not allowing it to be
offset by any other passive losses. The statute, however, does not

133. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 reinforces the requirement that
a partner must dispose of the entire interest in the publicly traded partnership, not just the
underlying passive activity, in order to recognize the suspended passive losses. Pub. L. No.
100-647, § 2004(g) (1988).
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redefine the gain as portfolio income. This raised questions about the
treatment of net passive gains in contexts other than section 469.
Notice 88-75 addresses some of these questions by providing that net
passive income from a publicly traded partnership will be treated as
"investment income for purposes of section 163(d) of the Code." 1 4 This
treatment for section 163 purposes suggests that net passive income
from publicly traded partnerships, in effect, will be treated as portfolio,
and not passive, income.
V.

CRITIQUE OF THE RECHARACTERIZATION

The provisions in the Revenue Act of 1987 that deal with the
treatment of master limited partnerships are justified as an attempt
to restore equity and as a solution to insurmountable administrative
difficulties. Unfortunately, the changes in the 1987 Act do little to
delineate a test that treats economically similar entities alike for tax
purposes. Moreover, because of the numerous exceptions to the rules
that tax publicly traded partnerships as corporations, most of the
problems outlined above will continue, albeit in a more circumscribed
area.
A.

Public Trading Is Not an Appropriate Standard

By selecting public trading as the dividing line, Congress has undercut its own efforts at correcting the tax equity and neutrality
problems. Congress has chosen public trading as the sole characteristic
that makes the Burger King master limited partnership qualitatively
different from a Mom and Pop burger stand that operates as a general
partnership. Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history
presents a convincing argument that public trading is the characteristic
that differentiates the two.
The justification for treating publicly traded partnerships as corporations for tax purposes is that they are essentially no different from
corporations. Using public trading as the overriding factor in classifying partnerships as corporations, however, ignores the wide diversity
among corporations. Most corporations are not publicly traded,' but
they still incur a corporate-level tax. Public trading is not now, nor
has it ever been, the determinative factor in whether an incorporated
business is subject to the corporate tax. Rather, in the corporate tax
area, the considerations have historically been the number and identity

134.
135.

I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-27 I.R.B. 29, at 33.
Lyman, supra note 1, at 119.
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of the shareholders 36 and the passive nature of the activities undertaken by the entity. 13 The Revenue Act of 1987 merely moves the
dividing line between partnerships and corporations from one inequitable place to another."' A limited partnership that is not publicly
traded but is economically similar to a nonpublicly traded corporation
would incur only one level of tax, while the earnings from the corporation would be subject to two levels of tax."39 Also, the existence of
public trading does not reflect the substance of the underlying entity.
A few investors with large sums of capital can conduct the same
business in the same form that would require many investors with
only small amounts of capital.140 Seemingly, this provision creates a
disadvantage for small investors, while continuing a tax advantage for
wealthy individuals.
B.

Too Many Exceptions

One of the most frequently given reasons for treating master limited partnerships as corporations is administrative difficulties. The
size and complexity of these entities cannot be squared with the
partnership tax provisions; complications range from the difficulty of
applying the section 754 election to the obstacles created by the auditing of thousands of partners. Several problems are inherent in this
argument. First, allowing problems with the administration of tax
laws to establish tax liability is like letting the tail wag the dog.
Administrative rules should carry out normative provisions, not vice
versa. Second, the new section 7704 excepts from corporate treatment
a large segment of publicly traded partnerships. Oil and gas and real
estate partnerships make up from one-third to one-half of all existing
master limited partnerships. These partnerships will maintain their
partnership status indefinitely. The Code will continue to treat existing
partnerships as partnerships for ten years. However, no additional

136.
137.
138.

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1361 (defining an S Corporation).
See infra text accompanying notes 142-45 (discussing REITs and REMICs).
Tax planners and commentators are responding not by moving into corporate form

but by exploring "how far away can one swim from a safe harbor without risking an attack by
sharks?" Banoff, Avoiding Publicly Traded PartnershipStatus: Living and Dying With Notice
88-75, 66 TAXES 561, 591 (1988). See also Haney & Holmes, Publicly Traded Partnerships
After the Revenue Act of 1987, 66 TAxES 331 (1988).

139. This assumes that the corporation does not satisfy and has not elected S Corporation
status.
140. For example, see the safe harbor in Notice 88-75 for partnerships that are not required
to register under the Securities Act of 1933 and has either not more than 500 partners or sells
units in amounts not less than $20,000. 1988-27 I.R.B. 29, at 30.
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guidance has been given on how to address the accounting, record
keeping, and fangibility problems associated with the taxation of these
partnerships. This leaves one of the major problems associated with
master limited partnerships completely unanswered.
The exception for partnerships with passive-type income is too
broad and reinjects equity and neutrality concerns into the partnership
area. Assuming that the decision to treat publicly traded partnerships
as corporations is correct, there needs to be some justification for
allowing some publicly traded partnerships to avoid the second level
of corporate tax. The House Report explains that:
The purpose of distinguishing between passive-type income
and other income is to distinguish those partnerships that
are engaged in activities commonly considered as essentially
no more than investments, and those activities more typically
conducted in corporate form that are in the nature of active
business activities. In the former case, the rationale for imposing an additional corporate-level tax on investments in
publicly traded partnership form is less compelling, because
purchasers of such partnership interests could in most cases
independently acquire such investments. 141
In the past, Congress has been willing to carve out other exceptions
to the general rule of two levels of taxation on corporations or associations taxable as corporations such as Regulated Investment Companies,142 Real Estate Investment Trusts,"3 and Real Estate Mortgage
Investment Conduits.'" The justification in those areas, as here, has
been that the corporation or trust holding the assets were merely
passive entities that allow investors to purchase interests in assets
that they could have held individually without incurring a second level
of taxation. The "price" of this exception from corporate tax has been
that the entity must act in a way that is truly passive. It must mimic
the situation that would exist if the investors actually held the
investments.
The flaw in the passive-type income exception contained in new
section 7704 is that it does not impose sufficient restrictions on these
publicly traded partnerships to insure that they behave in a way that
is actually passive. Other entities that are generally subject to the

141.
142.
143.

H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1068 (1987).
I.R.C. §§ 851-855.
Id. §§ 856-859.

144. Id. §§ 86OA-860G.
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corporate income tax but have received pass-through treatment have
several restrictions that are common to all. For example, RICs,
REITs, and REMICS all have requirements that: 1) force current
payout of income to their investors; 2) limit the types of assets they
can hold; 3) fix the pool of assets to be held early in the life of the
entity and restrict changes in the asset pool; 4) limit the amount of
income that can be earned from the sale of assets that have been held
for short periods of time; and 5) limit the managerial discretion of the
entity. 145
The exception for publicly traded partnerships that have passivetype income does not contain any of these restrictions. Without significant restrictions, the justification given for the exception rings hollow.
Specifically, these limited partnerships can retain current earnings
and reinvest them without the consent of the partners. They can sell
all the income-producing assets and purchase entirely different ones
without the consent of the partners. Finally, they can engage in active
managerial functions. Consequently, the interest of the partners in a
publicly traded limited partnership is qualitatively different from an
investment in the underlying assets. The position of a partner in a
publicly traded partnership that owns an apartment building is economically the same as a shareholder of a corporation that owns an apartment building. The single level of tax on partnership earnings and a
double level of tax on the corporate earnings merely continue current
tax incentives to do business in the form of a partnership.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Publicly traded partnerships are economically similar to corporations. Consequently, Congress should treat these partnerships as corporations for tax purposes. The changes in the treatment of publicly
traded partnerships in the Revenue Act of 1987 takes a significant
step toward preventing entities that are economically equivalent to
corporations from avoiding the corporate income tax. The reason that
taxing publicly traded partnerships as corporations is the correct result, however, is not that they are publicly traded; rather, it is the
correct result because they are economically similar to corporations.
By relying on public trading as the distinguishing feature, new section
7704 ignores important factors that make many limited partnerships
that are not publicly traded economically similar to corporations.

145. For RICs, see id. § 851(b); for REITs, see id. § 856(c); and for REMICs, see id. §§
860D(a), 860G(a).
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Treating publicly traded partnerships as corporations restores tax
equity and neutrality only within a very narrow range, and the passivetype income exception limits the effectiveness of the 1987 changes
even further. By focusing on the type of income rather than the activity
of the partnership, the legislation still allows favorable tax treatment
to some publicly traded partnerships that are strikingly similar to
other publicly traded partnerships and to corporations. Furthermore,
the publicly traded partnerships that escape recharacterization still
need to be given clearer guidelines on compliance with subchapter K
rules. Otherwise, they will continue to select their own conventions
that might or might not be consistent with the statutory requirements.
Congress needs to revisit the area of characterization and identify
which entities warrant pass-through treatment and which entities
should be subject to the corporate level tax. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 signalled a reinforcement of the second level of taxation on corporate earnings. Given that background, a consistent approach to
which types of entities and which types of income deserve pass-through
treatment has become increasingly important. Rather than the piecemeal approach evidenced by section 7704, Congress needs to address
the underlying policy issues presented by limited partnerships generally and decide which characteristics, regardless of the form of the
entity, justify a second level of taxation.
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